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Abstract—We propose a cooperation and accounting scheme
for multi-hop cellular networks, which stimulates cooperation
among nodes by making it a rewarding alternative to selﬁshness.
The paper describes an architecture with highly decentralized se-
curity and accounting mechanisms. Our scheme charges senders
and rewards forwarders, supports both sender- and receiver-
based payments and coexists with ad hoc only trafﬁc. We use of
service stations deployed throughout the network to offer nodes a
possibility to reﬁll their money accounts. We present the results
of simulation runs, where we investigated the liveliness of the
proposed scheme. We ﬁnd that the number of service stations
and their distribution correlate in different ways.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-hop cellular networks (also called hybrid networks)
increasingly attract interest in the research community. They
appear to be a promising combination of the advantages
of two worlds: the dynamics of mobile ad hoc networks
and the reliability of cellular networks. The motivation to
overcome the single-hop limit between mobile and access
point in (infrastructured) wireless networks and use multiple
hops instead, comes from the gained ability to dynamically
adapt the network topology to the respective needs. A better
and larger coverage area and reduced installation costs are
advantages for a wireless network provider in that case. Nodes
can reduce their energy consumption for transmitting packets
due to shorter next-hop distances. In the context of hybrid net-
works new possibilities to deal with the weaknesses of mobile
ad hoc networks become available. We think that besides the
security and routing issues the cooperation among nodes is of
great importance. We propose a cooperation and accounting
scheme for hybrid networks called CASHnet, which takes into
account the availability of a reliable network infrastructure and
stimulates cooperation by making it a rewarding alternative to
selﬁshness.
The application scenarios of mobile ad hoc networks have
become broader over time. Starting with nodes acting on
behalf of a single authority in emergency situations, today
we see civilian (and commercial) scenarios where each node
is its own authority. When we attribute individuality to each
node of a mobile ad hoc network, we have to deal with a
node’s individualism, especially in the form of selﬁshness. A
node expresses its selﬁshness in the refusal of cooperation, i.e.
an individual node might refuse forwarding packets from other
nodes in order to save energy for transmitting its own packets.
This behavior leads of course to a malfunctioning mobile ad
hoc network.
II. RELATED WORK
The ﬁrst generation of proposed cooperation schemes for
mobile ad hoc networks apply rather restrictive control mech-
anisms. Besides technical issues, restriction neglects the node’s
freedom of decision (to participate or to not participate) to a
certain extent. In civilian scenarios it seems more suitable to
achieve cooperation among nodes by means of rewards instead
of penalization. Moreover, by using the available infrastructure
in a multi-hop cellular network, it becomes possible to offer an
architecture which corresponds with this notion. So far most
of the cooperation schemes target mobile ad hoc networks
only. Recently, few approaches have been taken to address the
problem of cooperation among nodes in the context of multi-
hop cellular networks.
Several proposals have been made to stimulate cooperation
among nodes. The ﬁrst approaches were aimed at mobile ad
hoc networks and enforced cooperation by threat of punish-
ment. In the Nuglet [1] scheme a node can only transmit
self-generated packets when it has forwarded enough packets
from its neighbors before. In the CONFIDANT [2] approach
the behavior of a node is monitored by its neighbors and
a selﬁsh node will be isolated from the network. In both
concepts a node can be excluded from participating in the
network without itself being at fault (starvation or collective
false accusation).
With the Sprite [3] scheme rewards have been introduced as
incentive for cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks. Nodes
report their forwarding activities to a central authority reach-
able via an overlay network. In conjunction with the missing
security mechanisms this scheme seems highly vulnerable to
attacks and transmission errors. In [4] the authors suggest
the usage of rewards in multi-hop cellular networks and let
a central authority collect and analyze reports to decide about
rewards and punishments. However, the authors assume a
single-hop down-link (from the base station to the node),
which might not be available easily.
The authors of [5] and [6] propose similar charging
schemes, where cooperative nodes get rewarded in a multi-hop cellular network environment. They both heavily rely on
centralized accounting and security mechanisms. To remuner-
ate intermediate forwarding nodes, both schemes require the
complete route information from the sender to the receiver
(e.g. using source routing). However, source routing does not
scale well under high node mobility. Also, both schemes do not
support cost sharing between sender and receiver, when both
of them reside in different ad hoc networks. The sender also
has to pay for the distance from the gateway to the destination.
To better cope with misuse the authors of [5] require all
the network trafﬁc to go via the operator’s access points,
which leads to inefﬁcient routes for trafﬁc within the same
ad hoc network. [6] requires an existing AAA infrastructure,
which might not be available for all multi-hop cellular network
scenarios. In a recent proposal [7], the authors extended their
work from [5]. They introduced a local Nuglet counter for
each node to address the issues of inefﬁcient routes in pure
mobile ad hoc networks and a central auditing entity [4] to
better cope with abuse. The weaknesses of the Nuglet scheme,
such as the unresolvable starvation of selﬁsh nodes due to a
single counter and the unsuitability for civilian (commercial)
applications because of neglecting the node’s freedom of
choice (to cooperate or to not cooperate) remain as well as
the single-hop down-link.
With our scheme we provide decentralized accounting and
security mechanisms to the largest extent possible in a multi-
hop cellular network environment. We support initiator- and
receiver-based payments and we do not require full route
information from the sender to the receiver. Also, our approach
coexists with ad hoc only trafﬁc in the sense that nodes get
neither charged nor remunerated for this kind of trafﬁc. We
think that ad hoc only communication should be free since the
provider has no cost in terms of network trafﬁc. Although he
provides the security mechanisms via the smart cards, ad hoc
only communication would still be possible without him. The
charge for the security service could be based on a subscription
fee. Because we target multi-hop cellular networks in civilian
use, where each node can be seen as its own authority, we
leave the choice of cooperation to the node. But by providing
monetary rewards we make cooperation among nodes a gainful
alternative to selﬁshness.
III. CASHNET ARCHITECTURE AND OPERATION
In our scheme we assume - similar to the Nuglet [1]
approach - the existence of a tamper resistant device, such as
a smart card in each node. This device ensures a protected
environment, where the functions of our schemes can be
executed safely. Also, we assume the availability of a routing
algorithm, which provides the hop count to the base station
(e.g. AODV or DSR). Additionally, we require sufﬁcient
processing power and memory on the node. For our scheme
we deﬁne an architecture as displayed in Fig. 1.
The CASHnet charging and rewarding mechanism works
as follows: Every time a node wants to transmit a self-
generated packet (i.e. node O), it has to pay with Trafﬁc
Credits. Every time a node forwards a packet (i.e. nodes NA1
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- NA3 and NB1), it gets Helper Credits. Trafﬁc Credits can be
bought for real money or traded for Helper Credits at service
stations. Gateways provide the interconnection between the
ﬁxed networks and the mobile ad hoc networks.
Our security mechanisms are based on public key cryptog-
raphy. Nodes authenticate themselves using certiﬁcates issued
by the provider. To avoid the creation of bogus nodes, we
give a short lifetime to the certiﬁcates forcing the node owner
to regularly visit a provider’s service station. Transmitted
messages are digitally signed to provide non-repudiation (data
integrity and data origin authentication).
The operation of CASHnet is described in the following
paragraphs. Fig. 1 shows an example scenario to which all the
deﬁned steps can be applied. The following notation is used:
each paragraph describes a coherent phase of the operation
process. A phase consists of several enumerated actions, which
are executed consecutively. The processing of a phase can
be terminated by a reference to another phase ”⇒” or by
a termination command ”2”. Numbered list entries in the
form of questions indicated a forking of the processing path.
Either the ”[Yes]” or the ”[No]” path is executed. The nested
numbered elements of the chosen path are again executed
consecutively.
a) Setup Phase: Before a node N can participate in
the hybrid network belonging to operator P, node N has to
perform the following steps:
1) Obtain a personal smart card from provider P
which contains node N’s unique identiﬁer, node
N’s public/private key pair KN/KPN, a certiﬁcate
CertP(IDN,KN) issued by the provider, as well as
the provider’s public key KP (one-time action).
2) Update node N’s certiﬁcate CertP(IDN,KN) (as nec-
essary).
3) Load the Trafﬁc Credits account at the provider’s service
station by paying with real money and/or by transferring
Helper Credits (as necessary).
b) Initial Authentication Phase: Before a node can en-
gage in the communication as a packet originator O in the
hybrid network, it has to initially authenticate itself once to all
nodes participating in its communication (intermediate nodes
N and destination node D). This is done by sending an AUTH
Request message to the destination. This message contains
O’s identiﬁer IDO, its public key KO and the certiﬁcate
CertP(IDN,KN). Each node N along the path veriﬁes
the certiﬁcate CertP(IDN,KN) and - if valid - saves O’s
identity IDO and public key KO as a pair in an AUTH list.
After the successful validation of an AUTH Request message,
the destination sends back an AUTH Reply message to theoriginating node O. When node O receives the AUTH reply
message, it knows that a path with cooperative node exists and
can start with the transmission of self-generated data packets.
Also, every intermediate node N participating in the com-
munication needs to authenticate itself to the previous and
the next node along the path. To reduce the delay caused by
unauthenticated nodes on a forwarding path, each node in the
hybrid network authenticates itself to all its one-hop neighbors.
The identity and public key pairs of successfully authenticated
neighboring nodes are also stored in the AUTH list.
If a route changes and a new node joins the path, it is
already authenticated to its one-hop neighbors due to the
periodic neighboring authentication, yet the new node has to
authenticate the originator of the packet, which might cause a
small delay.
c) Packet Generation Phase: When a node O wants to
transmit a self-generated data packet to the destination D, node
O performs the following steps:
1) Is the packet going to leave node O’s ad hoc network
via the gateway?
No. a) The packet classiﬁes as ad hoc only trafﬁc and
therefore O does not get charged.
b) Form a signed packet PacketO and transmit it
to the next cooperative hop. 2
Yes. a) Determine the transmission cost of the packet.
(The transmission costs are related to the dis-
tance in hop counts to the gateway of O’s ad
hoc network.)
b) Does O’s Trafﬁc Credits account allow to pay
for the transmission cost?
No. O can not transmit a self-generated packet at
this time. 2
Yes. i) Debit O’s Trafﬁc Credits account accord-
ing to the transmission cost (sender-based
payment).
ii) Form a signed packet PacketO and trans-
mit it to the next cooperative hop. 2
PacketO = IDO|Payload|TimestampO|
SigO(Payload,TimestampO)
d) Packet Reception Phase: When a node N receives a
data packet PacketN−1, it performs the following steps:
1) Does the digital signature from the received data packet
SigN−1 as well as from the encapsulated original packet
SigO verify correctly?
No. Discard the packet. 2
Yes. Proceed to the next check.
2) Does the packet originate from outside node N’s ad hoc
network and has the destination D been reached (node
N equal node D)?
No. Proceed to the next check.
Yes. a) Determine the reception cost of the packet. (The
reception costs are related to the distance in hop
counts to the gateway of D’s ad hoc network.)
b) Debit D’s Trafﬁc Credits account according to
the reception cost (receiver-based payment).
c) Pass packet to the non-secured part of node N.
2
3) Does the packet originate from within node N’s ad hoc
network and is it not going to leave node N’s ad hoc
network via the gateway?
No. Proceed to the next check.
Yes. Proceed to the Packet Forwarding Phase (no ac-
counting for ad hoc only trafﬁc). ⇒
4) Does the packet originate from the previous node N−1?
No. a) Form a signed ACK message ACKN and send
it to node N − 1.
b) Discard the information from the previous node
N−1 to retrieve the encapsulated original packet
PacketO.
c) Proceed to the Packet Forwarding Phase. ⇒
Yes. Proceed to the Packet Forwarding Phase (no reward
for the packet originator). ⇒
ACKN = IDN|TimestampN|
SigN(SigN−1,TimestampN)
e) Packet Forwarding Phase: When a node N transmits
a forwarded data packet, it performs the following steps:
1) Form a signed packet PacketN.
2) Look up the next hop in the routing table towards the
destination D.
3) Save the next hop identity IDN+1 and the signature of
the packet to be forwarded SigN as a pair in a list.
4) Transmit the packet PacketN to the next hop.
PacketN = IDN|PacketO|TimestampN|
SigN(PacketO,TimestampN)
f) Rewarding Phase: When a node N receives an ACK
message from a successor node N + 1, node N performs the
following steps:
1) Does the digital signature from the received ACK mes-
sage SigN+1 verify correctly?
No. Discard the message. 2
Yes. Proceed to the next check.
2) Do the contained digital signature of the acknowledged
packet SigN and the successor node’s identity IDN+1
have a matching pair in the list?
No. 2
Yes. a) Credit N’s Helper Credits account.
b) Remove the matching pair from the list. 2
IV. LIVELINESS EVALUATION
In our ﬁrst simulation runs of the CASHnet protocol we
investigated the issue of starving nodes. In particular, we are
interested in the case when a node is unable to transmit self-
generated packets because it has not enough Trafﬁc Credits
(i.e. it has run out of Trafﬁc Credits or the hop distance of the
destination is to high).
A. Implementation Details
For the simulation we use ns-2 [8], where we implemented
a simpliﬁed version of the CASHnet scheme including theSimulation
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Fig. 2. Simulation Scenarios
charging and rewarding functionality without considering the
security mechanisms. In particular, we used the wireless and
mobility extensions [9] with an extended version of the AODV
protocol called AODV+ [10], which adds Internet gateway
discovery support.
We created a new ns node class called CashnetNode which
inherits from the class MobileNode. The class CashnetNode
contains the trafﬁc and the helper credits accounts. Addition-
ally, we implemented an agent at the source/sink, which is
responsible for the rewarding procedure. It generates ACK
messages and also evaluates them. The service stations are
represented as ﬁxed nodes derived from the class MobileNode.
We keep a static list with the available service stations and
their coordinates. The class MobileNode provides a method
to calculate the distance to any other node in the network.
Therefore, we are able to determine if a node is within range
of a service station. To be able to follow the events from
our CASHnet mechanisms we extended the class CMUTrace
from the wireless and mobility extensions. Currently we are
charging only for data trafﬁc.
B. Simulation Scenario and Setup
Fig. 2 shows our simulation scenarios. We only consider
one multi-hop cellular network in this simulation runs. The
simulation area is 1500 x 800 meters. A gateway is placed at
the border of the sector. 40 nodes are placed randomly inside
the area and every node is communicating to the gateway.
In the current simulation setup the movements of the nodes
are pre-calculated using the random waypoint model with a
minimum speed of 1 m/s and a maximum speed of 10 m/s.
The pause time is uniformly distributed between 0 and 20 ms.
The simulation runs for 900ms. The transmission range of a
node is set to 250 meters. Table I shows the parameters which
have to be speciﬁed for the CASHnet scheme. We give each
node the same starting amount of 100 Trafﬁc Credits, 500
Real Money units and no Helper Credits. The exchange rate
for Trafﬁc/Helper Credits is set to 1:1. When a threshold of
10 Helper Credits is reached, a node can exchange its Helper
Credits. The distance required between a node and a service
station to conduct an exchange of credits is set to 50 meters.
We vary the number and the distribution of deployed service
stations (1, 2, 9 and 12 as shown in Fig. 2 as well as 9 and
12 service stations distributed randomly) as well as the packet
interval at the CBR trafﬁc sources (1 s, 5 s and 10 s). For
each of the 18 simulation scenarios, 20 simulation runs have
TABLE I
CASHNET PARAMETERS AND THEIR DEFAULT VALUES
Parameter Value
Starting amount for Trafﬁc Credits account [TC] 100
Starting amount for Real Money account [RM] 500
Starting amount for Helper Credits account [HC] 0
Trafﬁc Credits/Helper Credits exchange rate 1:1
Exchange threshold at Service Stations [HC] 10
Distance threshold to Service Stations [m] 50
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Fig. 3. Starvation periods for all nodes during a single simulation run for
scenario A and D
been conducted. We measured the frequency of occurrence of
starving events and the duration of the starvation.
C. Results
Figure 3 displays each node’s starvation period(s) during a
single simulation run for scenario A and D. Fig. 4-7 contain
the results for the simulation scenarios A (1 service station),
B (2 service stations), C (9 service stations) and D (12 service
stations) for three packet intervals (10 s - top row, 5 s - middle
row and 1 s bottom row). Fig. 8 and 9 contains the results
for two scenarios with 9 and 12 randomly distributed service
stations respectively.
Each histogram categorizes starvation events according to
their duration. The boxes display the mean values of the num-
ber of starvations for the 20 simulation runs. The longer the
starvation period (x axis), the smaller the number of starvations
should be (y axis). A high amount of long starvations is
naturally much worse than many small starvations.
From the ﬁgures several conclusions can be drawn. In Fig. 3 0
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Fig. 4. Mean number of starvations per duration category for scenario A
the exhaustion of Trafﬁc Credits can be seen when the ﬁrst
nodes start to starve at around 100 s. The difference between
the top (1 service station) and the bottom (12 service stations)
is very obvious. In the ﬁrst, many nodes starve for the whole
simulation period in the latter only few nodes starve and even
fewer for a long time. The ﬁgures also show that it is difﬁcult
to achieve an equilibrium between generating and forwarding
packets so that no starvation occurs. This emphasizes the need
for separating the right for transmission from the amount of
forwarded packets.
Increasing the number of service stations reduces the overall
number of starvations and transforms long starvations into
short ones (compare Fig. 4 with Fig. 7). This can be explained
easily by the increased probability that a node can reﬁll
its Trafﬁc Credits account by exchanging Helper Credits or
paying with Real Money. When comparing the results of
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Fig. 5. Mean number of starvations per duration category for scenario B
scenario A in Fig. 4 with those of scenario B in Fig. 5 we see a
slight worsening of the result, although the number of service
stations is higher. This could be caused by the nodes movement
which have a higher probability of going through the center
of the simulation area. Increasing the sending rate leads to
an increasing number of starvations if the number of service
stations is high (see Fig. 7). A high number of transmitted
packets makes nodes run out of Trafﬁc Credits faster. Thus the
probability of a node not being able to transmit increases. Due
to the high number of service stations, mostly the occurrences
of short starvations increase. If the number of service stations
is low, increasing the sending rate has a different effect (see
Fig. 4). It mainly transforms the longer starvations into shorter
ones. The increased number of transmitted packets leads to
a higher amount of Helper Credits, which the nodes can
exchange at the service station. Deploying services stations 0
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Fig. 6. Mean number of starvations per duration category for scenario C
randomly is not as effective as placing them in a aligned
pattern (compare Fig. 7 with Fig. 9). Compared to the scenario
D, the scenario with 12 randomly distributed service stations
has a higher number of longer starvation periods. Thus an
equal distribution of service stations increases their helpful
effect on the overall network liveliness.
V. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We proposed a highly decentralized accounting and security
architecture which provides a solid foundation for a cooper-
ation scheme based on rewards and which is applicable to
multi-hop cellular networks. In contrast to previous work we
allow selﬁsh nodes, but encourage them to participate in packet
forwarding via rewards. Additionally, we allow initiator as
well as receiver based payment which - to the best of our
knowledge - is not possible in the available schemes. Last,
we do not charge nor reward for trafﬁc within the same multi-
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Fig. 7. Mean number of starvations per duration category for scenario D
hop cellular network (ad hoc only trafﬁc), while other schemes
do not allow that. We validated our scheme with simulation
runs and investigated the issue of starvation. Our simulation
results show that it is difﬁcult to achieve an equilibrium
between generated and forwarded packets so that nodes do not
starve. Our solution is to provide an additional mean of buying
the right for transmission via the separation of accounts and
the deployment of service stations. Future work will include
the comparison with other incentive mechanisms, study of
possible extensions (e.g. charging for ad hoc only trafﬁc) as
well as the optimization of the charging and remuneration
relation.
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